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RECENT DECISIONS
LABOR LAW - APPLICATION OF NORIS-LAGUARDIA ACT -
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT.-The
United States was in possession of, and operating, a major portion
of the country's bituminous coal mines under the authority of the
War Labor Disputes Act. Members of defendant union were em-
ployed therein under the terms of an agreement between defendant
Lewis for the union and Secretary of the Interior Krug for the
United States. Defendant Lewis requested renegotiation of the
agreement concerning the question of wages and hours, but was in-
formed that the agreement was valid for the entire period of Gov-
ernment operation of the mines and could not be renegotiated. Sev-
eral conferences were held between defendant Lewis and Secretary
Krug on these matters. On November 15, 1946, defendant Lewis,
by letter, declared the agreement terminated as of November 20,
1946, and circulated this letter to members of the union. The miners
traditionally would not work without a contract. The United States
then asked the federal district court for a restraining order requiring
defendant to suspend the termination notice and alleging it a strike
notice. A temporary order was granted restraining defendants from
continuing the notice, encouraging a strike, or from any action in-
terfering with the court's jurisdiction and determination of the case.
This order and complaint was served on defendants on November
18, 1946 and was ignored by defendants. On that date the miners
began a "walkout," and by November 20, 1946 there was a com-
plete strike. Defendants were cited for contempt, and on the return
day notified the court that no action had been taken concerning the
notice, and then denied the jurisdiction of the court to issue the re-
straining order and rule to show cause. Defendants filed a motion
to discharge and vacate the rule to show cause, challenging the jur-
isdiction of the court. The trial court held that the power to issue
a restraining order was not affected by the Norris-LaGuardia or
Clayton Acts 1 and that defendants permitted the notice to remain
outstanding and encouraged a strike, therefore interfering with gov-
ernmental functions and the jurisdiction of the court. Defendants
were found guilty of criminal and civil contempt and a new prelim-
inary injunction was issued pending final determination of the case.
Defendant Lewis was fined $10,000.00 and defendant union
$3,500,000.00. Held, affirmed, but the fine of the union is reduced
to $700,000.00. United Mine Workers of America v. United States,
- U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 677.
As the Norris-LaGuardia Act is broader than the Clayton Act
in application,2 it is possible to base the decision on the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, and if that doesn't apply, neither will the Clayton
147 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 (1940); 38 STAT. 730, 738 (1914),
29 U. S. C. § 52 (1940).
2 See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 231, 85 L. ed. 788, 793
(1941).
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Act.3 Under the rule of construction that statutes, which in general
terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges, will not be applied to
the sovereign without express words to that effect, 4 which rule was
known to Congress when it passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, this
Act cannot be applied to this case. This is so particularly since the
wording of Articles 2, 4, 7 and 13 of the Act all indicate that it was
not intended to affect the relations between the United States and
its employees,5 and as the records of the voting and discussion of
Congress show only an intent to prevent the United States from in-
tervening by injunction ih purely private labor disputes and not to
include the United States and its employees within the Act. 6 The
terms of the regulations under which the Government operated the
mines, 7 as well as the dealings between the parties and their actions,
show that an employer-employee relationship existed between the
miners and the Government regardless of arrangements between the
Government and the private owners of the mines.
Though orders of a court having no jurisdiction to make them
may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt,8 in
cases where only the Supreme Court can decide the question of
jurisdiction, the federal district court may make the necessary orders
to preserve existing conditions and the subject of the petition.9 Pend-
ing a decision on a doubtful question of jurisdiction, the district
court has power to maintain the status quo and punish violations as
contempt.10 An order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is
reversed by orderly and proper proceedings." Violations of an
order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is
set aside on appeal 12 or though the basic action has become moot; 18
therefore, regardless of the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
3 See Allen Bradley Co. v. Union; 325 U. S. 797, 805, 89 L. ed. 1939, 1946
(1945).
4 United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 22 L. ed. 275 (1873).
5 See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604, 85 L. ed. 1071,
1074 (1941); United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 321, 24 L. ed. 192, 193
(1876).
6 75 CONG. REc. 5464, 5473, 5503, 5505, 5509 (1932).
7 Revised Regulations for the Operations of the Coal Mines Under Gov-
ernment Control §§ 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 31, 40 issued by Coal Mines Adminis-
trator on July 8, 1946.8 In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 31 L. ed. 402 (1887) ; Ex parte Fisk, 113
U. S. 713, 28 L. ed. 1117 (1884).
9 Carter v. United States, 135 F. (2d) 858 (C. C. A. 5th 1943).
20 See Treines v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 74, 84 L. ed. 85, 91
(1939).
11 Russell v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 389 (C. C. A. 8th 1936); Howat
v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 66 L. ed. 550 (1922).
'12 See Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14, 25, 30 L. ed. 853, 857 (1887).
13 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. ed. 797
(1911).
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to this case, defendants are guilty of criminal contempt though they
may be purged of civil contempt.' 4
Pleadings which fairly and completely apprise the defendants
of the charges against them, though on information and belief, and
which are not harmful to defendants by omission to specifically charge
them with criminal contempt under rule 42 (B) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 15 as shown by defendants' pleadings and actions,
are not prejudicial to defendants. 16
It is proper to try both civil and criminal contempt actions at
the same time if the defendants enjoy all of the protections that
would have been afforded them in a criminal contempt proceeding. 17
The United States may proceed as a party to civil proceedings
in controversies to which the United States shall be a party.' 8  This
includes allowing the United States to bring civil contempt
proceedings.
Sentences for criminal contempt are punitive' 9 and the court
may consider the extent of the wilful and deliberate defiance of the
court, the seriousness of the defendant's actions, and the public in-
terest. In sentencing for civil contempt the court has a twofold
purpose, to force defendant to comply with its order, and to com-
pensate the plaintiff for his losses; 20 therefore the magnitude of the
harm threatened and the probable effectiveness of the fine is
considered.
2
'
In its decision the court placed great emphasis on the threat to
orderly constitutional government and the economic and social wel-
fare of the nation as well as on the lack of respect shown for the
court by the defendants.
H. A. R.
NEGLIGENCE- LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNER FOR PERSONAL IN-
JURIES TO STEVEDORES EMPLOYED BY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.-
Plaintiffs, stevedores, contracted a dermatitis when handling leaky
steel drums containing cashew nut oil, which leaked out of the drums
and onto the deck while plaintiffs were unloading ship owned by
14 Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme C. Process Corp., 86 F. (2d) 727
(C. C. A. 2d 1936).
15FED. R. CRIm. P., 42 (b).
16 Conley v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th 1932); Kelly
v. United States, 250 Fed. 947 (C. C. A. 9th 1918).
17 Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 69 L. ed. 767 (1925); see
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 67, 69 L. ed. 162, 168 (1924).
Is McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61, 83 L. ed. 1103 (1939); REv.
STAT. §§563, 629 (1875), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §41 (1940).
'1 Gonpers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 55 L. ed. 797 (1911).20 Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Co., 284 U. S. 448, 76 L. ed. 389 (1932).
21 See In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157, 168, 22 L. ed. 819, 823 (U. S. 1874).
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